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This study assesses the alliance currently developing between Armenia and Iran using the
framework provided by the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory. Armenia is
resorting to securitisation with regard to Turkey on the basis of genocide, and with regard
to Azerbaijan through the Nagorno-Karabakh Question. Iran, meanwhile, is securitising
Azerbaijan and Turkey within the framework of its own regional activities. Examining the
relationship developing between Armenia and Iran, in terms of the theory of securitisation,
will be helpful in revealing the psycho-social aspects of the tensions in this region.
Copyright  2014, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The South Caucasus is geographically located at the
intersection point of the eastwest and north–south energy
transfer networks and on the path of the historic Silk Road,
now in the process of being revived as a channel of eastwest
commerce. These are matters of direct interest to all global
and regional actors, including principally the European
Union (EU), Turkey and Iran. The situation in the South
Caucasus reﬂects the systemic power struggle between the
US, the leader in shaping the international system, and
Russia, which has been recovering its strength and is now13 50.
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nter, Hanyang University. Prodlooking to establish a regional hegemony in Eurasia across
the former Soviet territories in line with its “Near Abroad”
policy. This competition very much informs the attitudes
expressed by the states in the region to each another.
Demand for security will always be the most important
factor shaping foreign policy, and this requirement has
normally been examined using state-centred approaches,
taking security to consist merely of a set of exclusively
military issues. This study, by contrast, uses the assump-
tions of the social constructivist approach of the Copen-
hagen Schoolwith the assistance of a societal interpretation
to examine “security” in the context of the alliance growing
up between Armenia and Iran. It is important that security-
oriented foreign policy discourse is analysed with due re-
gard to the societal impulses which lie behind it, and the
approach adopted here, in emphasising the link between
societal demands for security and political security, pro-
vides a societal interpretation of an alliance which is nor-
mally considered only in military and state-centred terms.
The study surveys the conjunctural regional outlook in
the South Caucasus and then goes on to summarise the
ideas of the Copenhagen School concerning securitisation,uction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1 Security is dealt with in terms of military and political security on the
basis of realist theoretical premises. Expansionary security, meanwhile,
integrates ethnic issues, migration, economic and environmental security
into the understanding of security. Thus, the spectrum of threats relating
to the concept of security is broadened, and a multiplicity of subjects and
problems are included under the scope of security. Expansionary security
gives greater importance to human security than the security of the state,
sees all matters which threaten the security of the individual as properly
within the scope of security studies.
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how securitisation is likely to operate. Finally, the alliance
developing between Armenia and Iran will be examined
within the framework of the security approach set out by
the Copenhagen School.
2. A region riven by historical and systemic disputes:
South Caucasus
The South Caucasus is not an extensive territory in
geographical terms but it is home to a number of sharply
differentiated ethno-cultural, historical, and societal
entities, and is marked by a number of disputes arising
between those entities which have become integral to the
region’s politics. For many years the entire area was part of
the USSR, but its status changed signiﬁcantly with the end
of the Cold War. The signiﬁcance of the South Caucasus
derives from the network of systemic relations which
developed after the ColdWar (Cornell, 2010: 123–134). The
US, looking to open up the economic and political ﬁelds in
the Black Sea and Caspian basins, felt that its systemic he-
gemony was threatened by the developing multipolarity,
and acted in concert with its ally the EU to transform the
Southern Caucasus and bring it into line with their own
systemic approach. The South Caucasus is the shortest route
from Europe to Asia, avoiding Russia and Iran. The Euro-
Atlantic Alliance has political disputes with both Russia
and Iran, so the importance of the corridor stretching from
Turkey to the South Caucasus can be readily understood.
The systemic role of the South Caucasus is easy to appre-
ciate when one considers that global actors such as Russia
and China and regional actors such as Iran are all seeking to
introduce a multipolar dimension to the international
system which currently operates mainly according to the
systemic values and hegemony of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance
(Uzer, 2013: 69–93). Under circumstances currently pre-
vailing, this region is located precisely at the breakpoint of
this fault line. The competition which has been mentioned
affects the foreign policy of the countries in and around this
region, because their own prejudices about each other
operate as catalysts which render the South Caucasus a
highly conﬂicted region.
Of course, the most signiﬁcant factor which places the
South Caucasus ﬁrmly in the political limelight is energy
(Wisniewski, 2011: 58–79). The region has petroleum and
natural gas reserves which are important to the EU econ-
omy, and which reduce the EU and Turkey’s energy
dependence on Russia. The South Caucasus also provides an
alternative route for the transfer of petroleum and natural
gas resources fromCentral Asia and the Caspian Basin to the
West, by-passing Russia. The Baku–Tiﬂis–Ceyhan Petro-
leum Pipeline, the Baku–Tiﬂis–Erzurum Natural Gas Pipe-
line and the planned Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP)
projects are particularly signiﬁcant in this connection
(Rzayeva et al., 2012). On the other hand Russia, which is
interested in keeping the EU andTurkeydependent in terms
of energy, is not only applying pressure upon the EU and
Turkey through various political and economic channels,
but is also doing its utmost to draw the states of the South
Caucasus closer to itself. In order to achieve this, it is
exploitingwherever necessary thehistorical, ethno-culturaland political disputes between the various players. The
efforts of those players to order the distribution of energy
resources, far from promoting regional cooperation, are
introducing a network of conﬂict-based relationships into
the area.
South Caucasus may be a small region but it has a mul-
tiplicity of ethnic, religious, cultural, social and historical
factors which have to be taken into account. These differ-
ences shape the societal and political perception of the
countries in the region and increase tension. During the
Soviet era, these differences were kept on ice by the ideo-
logical control imposed across the area by the governing
authorities, but with the end of the Cold War these differ-
ences began to impinge in a way that signiﬁcantly affected
the political and regional outlook. These ethnic, religious
and cultural differences gave rise to forms of deferred or
“overdue” nationalism which arrived on the scene, with all
their customary divisiveness, to entangle the South Cauca-
sus. The wave of societal and political reactions ﬁrst
expressed itself in the regions of South Ossetia and Abkha-
zia, and even Adjara, in Georgia, impacting on Armenia–
Georgia relations via the Javakheti Question (Özkan, 2008:
211–248). Then cameArmenia’s occupation of theNagorno-
Karabakh, with its signiﬁcant Armenian population (and its
Azeri population, nowdisplaced). This issue,which revolves
around precisely the historical, ethno-cultural and religious
differences referred to, will be assessed here within the
context of the Armenia–Iran Alliance.
The dense network of relationships growing out of this
South Caucasus confrontation have generally been inter-
preted by the application of classical theories, but this
study will take a different approach, assessing relations
between Armenia and Iran in the context of their alliance
using the premises of the Copenhagen School: a societal-
based approach to security conceptualised in terms of
social constructivist theory.3. The Copenhagen School and the concept of security
The Copenhagen School arose as a reaction to traditional
views of security (Özcan, 2000: 13–15).1 Barry Buzan has
described those who approach security from a traditional
or realist direction as seeking to maintain what might be
described as a broadly military focus. According to him, the
ambition of the Copenhagen School, by contrast, is to offer a
more critical and enquiring approach to the whole of that
ﬁeld conceptualised as “security.” (Aktas¸, 2011: 7–47) The
Copenhagen School holds that security is the pursuit of
freedom from threat by states and societies, measured by
their ability to protect their independent identity and
functional integrity against competing forces (Sandıklı &
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analysis so that security is no longer viewed as exclusively
state-focused.
At the heart of the analysis proposed by the Copenhagen
School lies the concept of securitisation. Securitisation is
the characterisation of a particular item or issue as a threat
directed toward a subject which is known or agreed to be of
value, and the shifting of that characterisation outside the
normal political process, thereby justifying the imple-
mentation of emergency measures. An attempt at securi-
tisation may be entirely successful, successful to a limited
extent or may indeed be entirely unsuccessful.
If a particular matter is declared to be a security issue by
the élites who govern or lead society, it means that the
matter concerned has been securitised, and thus removed
fromnormal political process. Under this analysis, security is
not viewed as an objective circumstance, but rather as a
“speech act.” If a matter is securitised by social élites or
rulers, it suggests that the issue can securitised by the social
élites or government in a manner that suits their particular
interests or world view, which is to say that it can be legiti-
mised in societal/political terms (Waever, 1995: 46–86).
The Copenhagen School examines security not only in
the form of military security. Indeed, it proposes ﬁve main
security sectors: military, economic, political, environ-
mental and social. It was Barry Buzan who ﬁrst articulated
these sectors at an analytical level. These sectors do not
actually exist in objective terms, but they are vehicles of
expressions used for convenience at the level of analysis
(Buzan, 1983). Buzan asserts that these sectors cannot be
evaluated individually, and must be seen as processes
which are intimately related to each other, with one pro-
cess often triggering another.
The Copenhagen School suggests that it is essential to
distance oneself from the perception that security is a pos-
itive and necessary requirement of society (Buzan et al.,
1998: 23–25). It is precisely here that we see the consider-
able importance attached by the Copenhagen School to
discourse. According to this approach; words, concepts, and
even the dominant language of society have no objective or
intrinsic meaning because all of these elements are under-
stood in termsof the contentwhich individuals and societies
pour into them. It is essential to assess the meaning and
content of theword “security” bearing these considerations
in mind. The Copenhagen School holds that the idea that
“security is always good and necessary” plays a critical role
in the legitimisation of security-oriented policies. In their
view, instead of believing that security is always good and
necessary, one must retrieve issues from the security ﬁeld
and re-integrate them into normal politics. That is to say, it
is their belief that a de-securitised consciousness must
prevail in the societal/political arena (Aktas¸, 2011: 12–20).
A number of structural factors must be in place in order
to be able to implement securitisation effectively. Commu-
nication between the subjects is very important and this
communication can only be effectively structured at the
level of “discourse.” (Brauch, 2008: 1–47) Securitisation is
constructed noton objective foundations, but on the basis of
communication between subjects. Indeed the authority and
legitimacy endowed by security renders even an impossible
threat plausible (Bilgin, 2010: 83).When we consider matters which have been dealt with
through the process of securitisation, the primary compo-
nent that we encounter is the referent object or objects. The
referent object is the entity of which is described as being
under threat, and which must therefore be protected. Ter-
ritory, sovereignty, and the fatherland are all examples of
the sorts of objects which can be presented in this way. The
secondary component we encounter is the securitising
agent. This, as has already been explained, is an actor who
attempts to achieve securitisation by stating that the exis-
tence of the referent object is under threat. Such actors may
be members of social élites, the bureaucracy, politicians or
other groups. The third important component of the act of
securitisation is the functional actor. Functional actors are
those who directly or indirectly affect the operation of the
sector subject to securitisation. This may, for example,
include companies who might directly or indirectly be
affected by the securitisation of some aspect of commerce.
These actors endeavour to manage the securitisation for
their own beneﬁt. One of the most important elements of
the securitising approach is the target masses. Such masses
towhom the discoursewhich constitutes the essence of the
securitisation is addressed are themost important of all the
actors, and the reaction they display to the discourse in-
dicates the success or failure of the securitisation (Aktas¸,
2011: 15–16).
According to Ole Waever, securitisation is a conscious
and deliberate choice exercised by state élites and actors
who are attempting to manipulate society (Williams, 2003:
511–531). That is to say, securitisation is used by élites to
achieve certain objectives, to legitimise certain values or
ideologies, and to obtain the acceptance of the policies
those élites wish to impose.
Ole Waever considers that societal security is of prime
importance in Buzan’s sectoral analysis of security. Waever
describes societal security as the defence of an identity
against some other perceived identities. This form of
securitisation, which is constructed within the framework
of a them-and-us distinction, has a character which ex-
tends beyond state-oriented forms of securitisation. Soci-
etal security and political security are certainly interlinked,
but there is an important distinction between them in that
political security prioritises institutional stability and the
ideological or administrative integrity of states, while
societal security is the defence of an identity against a
perceived threat. For instance, there are many examples of
circumstances where the borders of states and societies do
not fully or even nearly coincide. This is a common situa-
tion which impinges upon societal security and therefore
requires close scrutiny. Assessment of such a situation
exclusively from the point of state security would almost
result in downplaying the identity-based security de-
mands of stateless peoples and minorities (Waever, 2008:
154). If security is deﬁned as the pursuit by societies and
states from threats, and as their ability or capacity to pro-
tect their identity and group integrity against competitor
or enemy forces (Buzan, 1991: 431–451), then societal
identities are quite distinct from political institutions
which deal in governmental or political power alone, and
their concept of security is also going to be different, albeit
connected.
2 The current president Serge Sarkissian is also a politician from
Nagorno-Karabakh.
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group perceives a development as a threat to its own ex-
istence, and this triggers an identity-based securitisation
which is quite independent of state. The matters which are
most commonly the subject of securitisation for such
groups or communities, and which are quite separate from
state security, are ethnic and/or religious differences
(Waever, 2008: 155).
Ole Waever views the elements of horizontal and ver-
tical competition associated with migration as the most
important of the threats to societal security. Migration is
important because when a group of people migrate to a
region, they may, over the course of time and by reason of
their population, come to exert political and economic
control of that region. The Chinese in Tibet and the Russians
in the Baltic states of Lithuania and Estonia are examples of
this process. Horizontal competition emerges as a result of
the growing impact of a group which has progressively
increasing geographical and political clout, and may begin
to affect elements of language and culture or other aspects
of life in the region concerned. The spread of the American
lifestyle in the context of globalisation is one example of
this. Vertical competition, meanwhile, is the complete
abandonment by a group living in a particular region of
their former identity as a result of a regional integration
project (such as the EU) or as part of a separatist project,
and the adoption of another identity which may be broader
(such as EU citizenship) or narrower (Bosnian Serb, Catalan,
Kurdish etc) (Waever, 2008: 158–159). Each of these
threats may be considered separately or in combination.
Of course, there is an underlying political objective here.
Particular societal group may resort to securitisation,
because it considers that the state in which it is living in-
tends to homogenise its population. Forced migrations and
ethnic cleansing operations witnessed throughout the
Balkans after the disintegration of Yugoslavia emerged as
part of a conﬂict of national identities securitised by states’
demands for homogeneous population.
If one societal group’s birth-rate falls while the pro-
portion of another societal group’s population increases,
the societal group with the falling birth-rate may resort to
securitisation. Meanwhile, the societal group with the ris-
ing birth-rate, if it is in a position of a minority within the
country, may be confronted with forced migration pres-
sures or policies applied by the state power under the
control of the dominant group in order to halt that group’s
population increase, and this may in turn provide grounds
for securitisation by this minority group.
If securitisation is not based upon a particular ethnic
group, but is religion-focused, it can be quite functional in
incorporating those societal groups who would otherwise
be reluctant to mobilise on the basis of an ethnic identity.
From this point onwards, religion will be used to reference
a particular identity. As was witnessed in the Balkans after
the breakup of Yugoslavia, peoplewere forced tomigrate or
massacred, because belief served the purpose of a separator
to deﬁne differing societal identities (Laustsen & Waever,
2000: 705–739).
One of the most important security elements which
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever linked to their theory of
securitisation was the concept of a regional securitycomplex (Hettne, 2008: 90–96). According to this issue,
security of every actor in a particular region is closely
related to the security of others, so that balance of power
can be understood through polarisation on a regional basis
in the form of a regional security complex. The most
important element determining the development of a se-
curity complex is the joining together of states and actors in
the face of a shared threat. Such a threat may serve the
development of relationships of mutual dependence be-
tween states. Factors such as historic relationship of amity
or enmity, clashes, shared enemies and parallel needs play
a primary role in shaping of a security complex. According
to the theory of securitisation, a state may occupy a place in
more than one security complex because the security needs
of states have increased and diversiﬁed with the acceler-
ating speed of globalisation.
4. Assessment of Armenia–Iran relations within the
context of the theory of securitisation
Before it had even declared independence, Armenia had
already initiated military action in Nagorno-Karabakh. This
whole question remains as yet unresolved and, as a live
ongoing issue, provides continuity to a political partnership
in Armenia which comprises the army, politicians origi-
nating from Nagorno-Karabakh (Caucasus Elections Watch,
2013),2 and nationalist parties/organisations such as the
Dashnak party who always view conﬂict as ideologically
legitimate. Armenians of the diaspora, who maintain a
constant and vivid discourse concerning the genocide,
which they view as their sole link with their Armenian
identity (Okutan, 2003: 79–90), provide diplomatic and
economic support for this alliance which dominates
Armenian politics.
The regime in Iran, meanwhile, is organised under the
control of clerics who assert that they are the represen-
tatives of true Islam. The government is under the ideo-
logical control of the Consultative Assembly (comprised of
clerics), the Army, the Revolutionary Guards, and the Basij
militias. Any demands for social or political change are
either immediately stiﬂed or repressed by force (Yegin,
2013: 47–69). The utterly intransigent and inﬂexible
response encountered by the leaders and supporters of the
Green Movement, who were critical of the current
governmental/ideological structure during the presiden-
tial election of 2009, gives some indication of the difﬁculty
of voicing any demand for political change in this country
(Bakhash, 2013: 4–5). Buzan’s observation that those who
take a realist view of security are those interested in
maintaining the existing military focus certainly seems to
ﬁt the situations in Iran and Armenia. It seems quite nat-
ural for these kinds of authoritarian regimes, generally
resistant to change, to act in partnership and to harmonise
their interests.
The idea of securitisation provides valuable assistance
in explaining the existing political systems in both
Armenia and Iran. Those who govern Armenia assert that
3 It is known that the Turkish Army provided arms and support to the
Georgian Army.
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Armenia are under threat from Turkey and Azerbaijan, and
that Armenian national identity can only be defended
through the adoption of an uncompromising posture
which prioritises military security. The achievement of any
solution which might satisfy both sides in Nagorno-
Karabakh is rendered impossible by Armenia’s securitisa-
tion of this region as integral to its own societal identity,
and by equating the security of Nagorno-Karabakh with
the political security of the state and people as a whole.
The same also applies to Armenia’s foreign policy which
sets its compass by the genocide. Armenian society refers
to the events of 1915 as genocide. The genocide discourse
has been subject to cross-generational societal securitisa-
tion which has shaped Armenian national identity to the
extent that Armenians living all around the world can be
expected to ﬁnd common cause and common ground in
the matter of the genocide. Armenia, which is the repre-
sentative of the Armenian national identity in the inter-
national arena, shifts this societal securitisation into the
political ﬁeld.
The situation in Iran is comparable with that in
Armenia. Following the Islamic Revolution, an authori-
tarian political structure under the tutelage of clerics was
established through the Wilayat al-Faqih (The Guardian-
ship of the Jurists), and Iran then witnessed the devel-
opment of a societal/political construct which was
securitised as the keystone of Iranian identity and of
Shi’ite belief in order to maintain the continuity of the
regime. Iran, which grounded its securitisation on
sectarian basis rather than on ethnic identity, presented
itself as the political leader of Shi’ism. By doing so, it
placed Iranian society under the burden of maintaining
the leadership of the Shi’ite community, which in practice
means protecting the existing political structure. The
Revolutionary Guards and the Basijmilitias, both of which
are “civilian-based” organisations, also contribute to the
effort to ensure that the structure created by the Islamic
Revolution in Iran is protected by a popular-based species
of legitimisation/securitisation (Sinkaya, 2011: 123–155).
The Iranian regime’s characterisation of the US as the
“great Satan” (Tabaar, 2006: 20–45) seeks to inculcate in
its own population the illusion that Iran has been engaged
in a battle with “Satan and his allies” and in this way it
seeks to establish a presumption that all Iranians must act
in concert with the regime.
Thedominantpolitical culture inArmenia is nationalism,
a nationalism which makes reference to the historic terri-
tories of Armenia. The institutionalised regime, partnered
by politicians and ﬁgures who originate from Nagorno-
Karabakh (currently under Armenian occupation), soldiers,
and diaspora Armenians (Jaloyan, 2009) deploys elements
which are fundamental to Armenian identity such as
Nagorno-Karabakh and the genocide, in order to maintain
the continuity of their own political leadership, and to
ensure that their own views are accepted by Armenian so-
ciety as awhole, therebysustaining their continued societal/
political legitimisation.
The Iranian regime asserts that Iran is the most
important political embodiment of Shi’ism and that this
is why it has to assume the role of leadership ofworldwide Shi’ism. It securitises the Islamic Revolution
and the existing status quo by reference to a thesis that
Sunnis (and also foreign actors interpreted in religious
terms as “Satan”) are the enemies of Iran (Barzegar,
2008: 87–99). Thus they use religious discourses which
provoke a powerful response in society to ensure the
continuity of rule by the clergy, the military, and the
state bureaucracy, ﬁctionalised as a regency acting on
behalf of true Islam.
Even a brief assessment of the ﬁve main security sectors
identiﬁed by Barry Buzan shows that the convergence be-
tween Armenia and Iran has a certain logic. In terms of
military security, Armenia perceives itself as under threat
from Azerbaijan and Turkey, and holds that its security
depends on Russian assistance (Minassian, 2008). But so
recently Armenia has begun to display some interest in
balancing and moderating its military and economic
dependence on Russia. The cooperation developed by
Turkey and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus, including
Georgia to some extent (Baran, 2004: 279–280),3 has
pushed Armenia in the direction of military cooperation
with a regional actor other than Russia, and that actor is
Iran. Russia, for its part, does not oppose to the military
cooperation sought by Armenia with Iran. Russia is also
interested in obtaining the support of Iran to balance the
South Caucasian alliance comprising Azerbaijan and Geor-
gia, backed by the Euro-Atlantic Alliance under the lead-
ership of Turkey. Iran also takes a positive view of the
development of military cooperation with Armenia,
because, quite apart from the existing military cooperation
between Azerbaijan and Turkey, there is also talk of
possible military cooperation by those actors with Israel
(Abilov, 2009: 138–156). This inclines Iran, which perceives
itself as under threat by Israel, to take a favourable view of a
military partnership with Armenia, and Russia’s favourable
view of this cooperation gives Iran further conﬁdence in
going down this path. A similar picture appears when one
looks at the economic sector. In regional economic terms,
Armenia ﬁnds itself in a rather lonely position, isolated
from the energy, trade and transportation projects upon
which Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan are collaborating.
Indeed, Armenia is almost entirely dependent upon Russia
for energy resources, but has to maintain those trade and
economic links via Georgiadwith which Russia is in
dispute. When this routewas brieﬂy interrupted during the
Russia–Georgia War in August 2008, it became very
obvious to Armenia that it was going to have to create other
options for itself (Sanamyan, 2011), and Iran was clearly a
potential candidate. Iran is useful to Armenia in the area of
energy, but there is also a good ﬁt in the economic and
commercial ﬁeld. Iran is in major dispute with Azerbaijan
over the sharing of petroleum and natural gas deposits in
the Caspian Sea (Terzioglu, 2008: 26–45). This means that
Armenia’s search for economic cooperation has beneﬁts for
Iran in that it offers some relief to the embargo imposed
upon it, and also permits to increase its regional effec-
tiveness with energy and transport projects (Moniquet &
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Buzan, as we have previously stated, is achieved by using
societal forms of legitimisation such as those based on
sectarian afﬁliation, as well as ethnic/national identity,
presenting Turkey and Azerbaijan as the threats in the case
of Armenia, and presenting Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, and
the US as the threats in the case of Iran.
The permanent securitisation maintained by Armenia
on the basis of ethnic distinction, and by Iran on the basis of
religious/sectarian difference, keeps all socio-cultural,
economic or lifestyle-related dissatisfactions experienced
in those countries off the political agenda. The perception
that security is always desirable and always has to be
protected has become ingrained in the societal conscious-
ness of both countries, and this ensures the continuity of
the existing regimes which have drawn identity-related
issues, both ethnic and religion-based, to the centre of
the security understanding. That is to say, societal pre-
sumptions associated with the term security can ensure the
continuity of authoritarian regimes which would otherwise
be unacceptable by normal standards of good governance.
The plight of the opposition under Levon Ter Petrossian in
the Armenian presidential elections in 2008 (Tüysüzoglu,
2013: 240–245) and the vigorous suppression of the
Green Movement in the Iranian presidential elections in
2009 are both prime examples of this mechanism.
A securitisation is managed by means of discourse
within the framework of a process conducted between
subjects. The reference objects used by the Armenian
regime are: the security of Nagorno-Karabakh, deemed to
be part of the historic territory of Armenia; guarantees for
the safety of Armenians living in these territories; ensuring
that these lands are a viable home for the Armenians living
there; and conclusively proving the historic assault on
Armenian identity by achieving Turkey’s admission of the
genocide (Okur, 2010: 13–34).5
The actors, who are applying securitisation bymeans of
the discourse are the nationalist parties, politicians and
élites; the bureaucracy; the military; and politicians
originating from Nagorno-Karabakh. The functional actors
who have an indirect role in the securitisation are: the
diaspora who keep the genocide discourse alive; Russia
(upon which Armenia considers itself overly dependent
because of its isolation in the region); and local and
foreign companies who derive a proﬁt from the current
situation.4 In addition to various other joint economic initiatives agreed between
Iran and Armenia in 2009, their agreement on the construction of a
hydro-electric power plant on the Arax river, the modernisation of the
energy infrastructure on Armenia–Iran border, the construction of a pe-
troleum pipeline from Iran to Armenia and the construction of a 470 km
railway between the two countries is very important in terms of eco-
nomic cooperation. Parallel with this agreement, discussions are also
ongoing between Armenia and Iran on the signature of a free trade
agreement.
5 This aspiration, referred to by the expression Greater Armenia, en-
compasses, in addition to the territory of the contemporary state of
Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern Anatolia and the Javakheti region of
Georgia. Clearly this would be a long term goal and in reality probably
impossible to achieve, but it nevertheless has genuine currency in
Armenia and among the diaspora.In Iran, the reference objects at stake in the securitisa-
tion are the belief that Shi’ite Islam is under threat; the
belief that Western actors, including the US in particular,
wish to attack Iran and bring it low just as Iraq and Syria
have been brought low, and thereby ending Iran’s political
sovereignty. The actors interested in applying this securi-
tisation are: the Wilayat al-Faqih represented by Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei; the Consultative Assembly which is
composed of clergy, the Iranian military; the Revolutionary
Guards; the Basij militia; and the state bureaucracy (Nader,
2013; Sadjadpour, 2009). Functional actors whowish to see
Iran maintain this position include Russia, because of its
systemic concerns, and Armenia because of its search for a
regional alliance.
The media play a key role in structuring societal and
political securitisation in both Iran and Armenia. In Iran,
ideological censorship is imposed across the media as a
whole. A special court is entirely devoted to monitoring the
Iranian media, and any media organ can be readily intim-
idated because if they publish anything that runs contrary
to the ideology (that is to say, which expresses any alter-
native view of those matters onwhich the state has applied
a process of securitisation), they can be summarily ﬁned,
closed down, or their licences will be withdrawn. An
overwhelming majority of Iranian society (up to 80%) use
the state media as their main source of news. This means,
themajority of the Iranian population are fully aware of and
informed about those issues to which the state wishes to
draw their attention, but simultaneously completely un-
informed about any matter which might challenge or un-
dermine the authorities (Sepehri, 2007; Tezcür, 2010).6
Television channels, and radio and internet sources, un-
like the news agencies and newspapers, do challenge the
societal security, albeit to a very limited extent. Public do
have some opportunity, using satellite dishes in their
homes, to follow the news more objectively by looking at
opposition, which they may be able to pick up, but this is
also monitored relentlessly by the regime (Bakeer & Dinçer,
2011; Tribune, 2012).7
Armenians form the most important Christian minority
in Iran. The Armenian publication Alik is the second most
long-standing publication in Iran after Ettela’at. This
newspaper, which receives economic support from the
Iranian Ministry of Culture, is very important to Iranian
Armenians, and through such channels Iran endeavours to6 One should provide just a few examples of the extent of manipulation
of the media in Iran, and its securitisation in line with the interests of the
regime. One might point ﬁrst of all to the Fars News Agency which pre-
sents itself as Iran’s leading independent news agency, competing with
CNN, but is known to be very close to the Revolutionary Guards, as is the
Mashregh news agency also. The Mehr news agency and a number of
other agencies with names prefaced with “Iran” are coordinated by
various organs of the Iranian regime. While the Tehran Times, Keyhan,
Entekhab and dozens of other newspapers are directly aligned with the
regime, publications like Etemaad and Aftab e Yazd, the most important
representatives of the reformist wing, are under very tight control and
subject to relentless censorship.
7 A number of television channels such as the Marjan TV Corporation
and the Persian Broadcasting Company broadcast by satellite from
countries which are not on good terms with Iran, such as the United
Kingdom and the US. Iran’s response to these channels is PRESS TV.
9 The Azeri territories under occupation, together with Nagorno-
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tised perceptions. The Alik group also owns printing facil-
ities, and is currently seeking to establish a TV channel. Alik
is the only Armenian language newspaper published in
Iran, but the Armenian weekly literary and cultural maga-
zine Arax is also published and distributed, with state
support, in those areas where most Iranian Armenians are
found such as Tehran, Isfahan and north-eastern Iran
(Moniquet & Racimora, 2013: 6–7). This attitude on the part
of the Iranian establishment is a component of its policy to
ensure the loyalty of Armenian citizens to the regime, and
assists the process of partnership with Armenia.
There is a comparable situation in Armenia. Here too the
media plays a critical role in extending societal securitisa-
tion. Tight control is exerted over the whole of the media,
both publicly and privately owned, including organs such
as Yerkir, the newspaper of the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation, internet-based news sources such as Hrazdan,
PanArmenian and Tert as well as Radio Yerevan, Shoghakat
TV (recognised as the media outlet of the Armenian Or-
thodox Church), Hrazdan TV, Armenian State Television and
Armenia TV (Mikaelian, 2011; Pearce, 2011). The securiti-
sation structured on a discourse relating to the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh and the genocide propagated by the
broad political coalition also affects the media. Media is
directed towards keeping the Turkish-Azerbaijani threat
permanently on the agenda, thereby keeping the attention
of the Armenian population focused on a single issue, and
legitimising the occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Alongside the media, political parties also have an
important role in securitisation. No political party can
participate in political life in Iran unless it explicitly accepts
the current conﬁguration of the state, and this acceptance
has to be approved by the Council of the Guardians. It is
generally acknowledged that parties and politicians on
both the conservative and reformist wings are kept under
close control, but in terms of political ideology, there is not
much to choose between them. A number of parties and
groups who refused to accept this process either left the
country or were driven out (Katzman, 2013).8
The parties, for whom Armenia’s current security-
oriented foreign policy is a non-negotiable item, form the
majority in the parliament. In addition to the ruling
Republican Party, political parties such as the Prosperous
Armenia, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the Rule
of Law, and the Heritage have a broadly nationalist agendas
in that they make identity a political issue. They position
themselves as socialist, liberal or centrist but in fact there is
not a great deal of difference between them. The most
signiﬁcant force of change in the Armenian Parliament is
the Armenian National Congress formed in 2008 by 13
political parties and led by Levon Ter Petrossian (Lorusso,
2013). This coalition, which focuses on economic matters
and on broadening freedoms rather than on identity issues
and security-orientated policies, is very closely monitored
and under pressure from the government.8 The People’s Mojahedin of Iran, the Iranian National Front, the
Fedayeen and the Iranian Constitutional Party are all political parties
which are active abroad and also have signiﬁcant support within Iran.If societal security is the defence of an identity against a
perceived threat, then any areas where the boundaries of
societies and states do not coincide deserve close attention.
It is clear that issues of this kind in Armenia and Iran are
among the most signiﬁcant of the factors that are driving
the two into regional partnership. The Nagorno-Karabakh
region currently occupied by Armenia has, since the time
of the USSR, hosted a substantial Armenian population. It is
reported that during the period under the USSR, the
Armenian and Azeri populations in this region lived
without serious intercommunal problems, but when it
became apparent that the region was to pass to Azerbaijan,
the Armenians entered a state of alarm. The fact that the
boundaries of Armenian society did not coincide with the
section of territories which were to be allocated to Armenia
provoked a clash between the Armenians and the Azeris in
Nagorno-Karabakh, and this clash was aggravated by in-
terventions by the national states, culminating in the
occupation. In the course of this occupation, the whole of
the territory surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, where the
overwhelmingmajority had been of Azeri ethnicity (Yılmaz
& Ismayilov, 2011: 4),9 came under occupation. A similar
situation applies for Iran. Today, the Azeris form the ma-
jority of the population in the northwest of Iran. Indeed,
Azeri nationalists even refer to this region as Southern
Azerbaijan (Kamrani, 2009: 147–151). The emergence of a
national state called Azerbaijan after the breakup of the
USSR, and the aspirations within this country and among
those of Azeri ethnicity in Iran to establish a united state of
what might be termed Greater Azerbaijan was a source of
some unease for Iran (Shaffer, 2013; Souleimanov &
Ditrych, 2007: 101–116). The fact that the object of socie-
tal/political securitisation for both Iran and Armenia is the
same tends to push both of them towards partnership in
terms of regional security.
Elements such as migration, horizontal competition and
vertical competition have played an important role in
securitisation (Waever, 2008: 158–164).10 Looked at in this
way, it appears that the immigration seen in Armenia
because of the economic crisis it has experienced, is being
politically securitised as an important societal problem.
Considered in historical terms, the forced migration expe-
rienced by Ottoman Armenians in 1915 formed one of the
most important components of the Armenian national
identity (Aghajanian, 2009: 34–41; Avagyan, 2012: 203–
214; Özdogan & Kılıçdagı, 2012), and Turks/Turkey began to
be characterised as aggressive enemies or aggressively
opposed to all things Armenian. During the breakup of the
USSR, Armenians living in Azerbaijan in particular, unable
to locate themselves within the Azeri national identity,
were obliged to migrate, and this, combined with the crisis
in Nagorno-Karabakh, resulted in Armenian society
resorting to societal securitisation against Azeris andKarabakh, amount to 20% of the area of Azerbaijan.
10 Horizontal competition is the process by which a society with pro-
gressively increasing geographical and political inﬂuence begins to affect
another society’s language and culture. Vertical competition, however, is
the complete abandonment of a former identity, by resort to a social
securitisation with a more narrow scope.
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nian society in Iran. During the time of the Shah, and also
after the Islamic Revolution, Armenian society accommo-
dated itself to whichever was the current regime and did
not seek to assert any claims to autonomy. This situation
helped to lay the societal groundwork for the convergence
of Armenia and Iran.
When assessed in terms of horizontal competition,
Nagorno-Karabakh is a focus of consciousness for Arme-
nians. The risk that Nagorno-Karabakh, viewed by Arme-
nians as an inseparable historical element was likely to be
left to Azerbaijan, galvanised the Armenians. Iran is prey to
similar fears. Iran has a very large population coming from
the Azeri ethnicity. The fact that a signiﬁcant portion of this
population lives in north-western Iran, centred around the
city of Tabriz and forming the majority in that area, results
in a societal/political securitisation on the part of Iran with
regard to the Azeris, based on a concern that the region
might seek separation from Iran in order to unify with
Azerbaijan.
Growth rate of population also matters to securitisation.
Armenian and ethnic Iranian populations are slowing, or
indeed beginning to shrink. The population of Armenia in
July 2013 was 2.9 million, with nearly half (46%) aged 25–
54, indicating that the population has begun to age. The
annual mean population increase is 0.14% (CIA, 2013a,
2013b). By contrast, the population of Azerbaijan, the
nation which Armenia perceives to be an enemy, was over
9.5 million in July 2013. The majority of the population in
Azerbaijan is in the 25–54 age range, but 22.6% are in the 1–
14 age range. According to 2013 statistics, the rate of pop-
ulation increase in Azerbaijan, at 1.01%, is verymuch higher
than that of Armenia (CIA, 2013a; 2013b). The fact that
Azeris outstrip the Armenians in terms of population is a
cause of securitisation of the Armenians against the Azeris.
The same also applies for Iran. No clear ﬁgure is avail-
able to indicate what proportion of the Iranian population
is of Turkic origin, but it has been claimed that there are at
least 20 million and perhaps as many as 35 million people
of Turkic origin in Iran, with Azeris making up the largest
group (Akdeniz, 2008; Gökdag & Heyet, 2004: 51–84).
The Khojaly massacre committed by Armenians against
Azeris, and also the forced migration of a million Azeris
from the territory of Azerbaijan which was occupied by
Armenian armed forces, are indications of a demand for the
establishment of a homogeneous population, with securi-
tisation on the basis of Armenian identity. In a comparable
incident, a pogrom was inﬂicted against Armenians by
Azeris in Sumgait (Cornell, 1999: 14–15; Kaufman, 1998). In
Iran, however, efforts are made to build identity on religion
rather than ethnicity in order to avoid societal groups such
as Azeris, Kurds, Baluchis, and Arabs securitising on the
basis of ethnicity.
In this context, any discourse of ethnic securitisation of
Azeri and Baluch people in particular is very closely moni-
tored, and measures are taken to repress and confound any
such initiatives (BBC, 2010; Boladai, 2010; Jahani, 2004).
The interest in establishing homogeneous populations may
be based on different referents in Armenia and Iran, but the
fact that both countries are engaged in such activities is a
factor which promotes their convergence.Religion is a potentially powerful factor in societal
securitisation. Religion can function as a separator in
legitimising securitisation and distinguishing different
social groups. Very clear examples of this process were
witnessed in the Balkans during the break-up of Yugoslavia
(Sekulic et al., 2006: 797–827). Looking at religion within
the process of securitisation in Armenia, it is, of course,
uncontentious to say that Christian Armenians and Muslim
Azeris separate themselves by a religious dividing line. In
such a context, religion is used as a referent for national
identity. In Iran, on the other hand, since the majority of
Azeris are Shi’ite, the state emphasises a commonality
shared by Azeris and the Iranian state in sectarian afﬁlia-
tion, in order to head off any tendency Azeris may have to
act on the basis of an ethnic or national identity. Armenians
distinguish themselves from Azeris on the basis of religion,
using religion as a separator for the purpose of securitisa-
tion, while in Iran, the precise opposite is true. Iran uses
religion in order to prevent any Azeri separatism based on
ethnic/national identity.
One of the most important aspects explaining the
cooperation between Iran and Armenia is the aspect what
Barry Buzan describes as regional security complex. A
regional security complex which establishes alliances re-
ﬂects the mutual dependency in the face of a common
threat and links the security of the countries/peoples
participating in those alliances. The cooperation which has
developed recently between Armenia and Iran is a mani-
festation of just such a regional security complex. Both
actors apply a societal securitisation to Azeri national
identity and to the state of Azerbaijan. Armenia is region-
ally isolated and Iran is systemically isolated so both actors
have sought to meet some of their needs by collaboration
on matters such as trade, energy, transport and regional
security. Iran gets a new market for its energy resources
while Armenia, cut off from the commercial trafﬁc of the
South Caucasus, relieves its economic trouble, at least to
some extent, by access to an export market. The two states,
which are developing a partnership based on mutual
dependence in energy and commerce, also pursue coop-
eration in the ﬁeld of security against Azerbaijan that
viewed as their common enemy. The partnership between
Armenia and Iran which is supported by Russia, can also be
viewed as an initiative to provide a power balance against
another regional security complexdthe ongoing coopera-
tion between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijandbut it must
be noted that this alliance is legitimising regional polar-
isation in the South Caucasus and consolidating societal
securitisation.
5. Conclusion
The theory of securitisation makes an important
contribution to the evaluationof relations betweenArmenia
and Iran. Onemust conclude that themost important factor
underlying the cooperation of Iran and Armenia is that both
perceive Azeri and Turkish identities and their respective
national states as threats to Iranian and Armenian societal
and political security. Securitisation of Armenian and Ira-
nian identity is the most important tool of the regimes in
those countries for themaintenance of their own legitimacy
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claims to be effectively defending against an ongoing threat
to ethnic or religious identity, cannot be retrieved from the
domain of security or opened up for discussion as part of
normal political debate.
Ruling groups in Armenia and Iran are using certain
élites in order to promote a transmissibility of discourse
between the subjects, and they are also linking elements
such as the media, education and political parties into their
own discourse. Regimes (that is, the securitising actors)
which use competing referent objects of alternative iden-
tity such as Nagorno-Karabakh and South Azerbaijan draw
in the Armenian and Iranian peoples, (that is, the target
masses) by means of discourse. Meanwhile Russia and the
diaspora Armenians can be seen as the most important
functional actors affected by this securitisation.
When it appeared that Nagorno-Karabakh was to pass
to Azerbaijan, the Armenians, who perceive the forced
migration to which they were subjected during the
Ottoman period in 1915 to be the keystone of their ethnic
identity, assumed that they would be unable to withstand
horizontal competition with Azeri identity and occupied
the territory. A similar situation prevails in north-western
Iran, where any supervention of Azeri ethnic identity over
Iranian identity is unthinkable for Iran. The fact that both
countries are seeking to create societies which are homo-
geneous in their own respective terms (Armenia, by refer-
ence to ethnic/national identity and Iran by reference to
religious/sectarian identity) is one more common factor.
The situation in north and north-western Iran, as with the
Nagorno-Karabakh question, provides further evidence
that locations where borders of states and the borders of
societies do not coincide can be an important securitising
factor. The most important matter contributing to conver-
gence between Armenia and Iran is the fact that in both
Nagorno-Karabakh and in north-western Iran, Azeris create
problem for both of the countries. Rapid population growth
in Azerbaijan and also among the Azeris of Iran also draws
Armenia and Iran closer together in their engagement in
the same forms of securitisation.
Armenia–Iran alliance can be understood within the
framework of systemic and regional demands, but in terms
of the securitisation approach of the Copenhagen School, it
appears to be an attempt to establish a regional security
complex. Similar societal/political reﬂexes operating in
these two countries (Iran is systemically and Armenia is
regionally isolated) have prompted them to resort to
securitisation against the same societal groups. The result
is establishing a regional security complex based on
mutual interdependence around an axis of shared in-
terests and threats. Indeed, some steps have already been
made with the signing of cooperation agreements focused
on energy, trade and transport, suggesting that in the
future these two states will be integrating their respective
security arrangements, with the support and encourage-
ment of Russia. This will, in effect, be a response to the
regional security complex formed in the South Caucasus
by Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The outcome of this
alliance will be the development of a new security bloc
bringing, in its turn, intensiﬁed regional competition and
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